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IS U.S. PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS 
IN THE MIDST OF A TRANSFORMATION?
HARRY C. KATZ*
In this article the author assesses whether a fundamental transfor-
mation is underway in public sector (state and local government) 
labor relations in the United States by revisiting the arguments 
made by the author and Kochan and McKersie (1986) regarding the 
transformation of labor relations in the private sector. The author 
argues that the economic pressures that led to a transformation of 
private sector labor relations starting in the 1980s have not played a 
comparable role in recent developments in the public sector be-
cause of the political nature of labor relations in that sector. Other 
insights are drawn from a comparison of recent developments with 
events that occurred during the mid-1970s, an earlier taxpayer revolt 
era. The author concludes that a fundamental transformation in 
public sector labor relations has not occurred, attributable to some 
degree to the limited decline in public employee union membership 
and the fact that a majority of the public has favorable attitudes to-
ward public sector employees and union collective bargaining rights. 
Factors that might lead to such a transformation in the future are 
highlighted.
Over the last several years a number of state and local government po-litical leaders and commentators have called for sharp limits on the 
collective bargaining rights of public employees and the unions that repre-
sent those employees. These calls have been bolstered by claims that public 
employees are overpaid and that their overly generous pension benefits are 
unsustainable. In a number of states new laws to eliminate or limit public 
sector collective bargaining and union rights have been enacted or pro-
posed (Dannin 2012; Hurd and Lee forthcoming). These claims and the 
legislative actions that have followed have raised concerns about the future 
of public sector labor relations.
In this article I assess whether a fundamental transformation is underway 
in public sector labor relations in the United States. I do so by revisiting the 
arguments made by the author and Kochan and McKersie (1986) regarding 
the transformation of labor relations in the private sector. At the core of this 
assessment is an evaluation of whether the power held by public sector 
*Harry C. Katz is the Kenneth F. Kahn Dean and the Jack Sheinkman Professor of Collective Bargain-
ing at the School of Industrial & Labor Relations, Cornell University. The author thanks participants in 
the Collective Bargaining Workshop at the ILR School, Jeff Keefe, Tom Kochan, and three anonymous 
referees for helpful suggestions, and Shane Seppinni for able research assistance.
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unions has significantly eroded. The basic sources of bargaining power in 
the public sector are clarified and contrasted with the sources of bargaining 
power in the private sector. Focus in this article is placed on state and local 
government labor-management relations because the critics of public em-
ployee collective bargaining focus on that sector and because the over-
whelming majority of employees who work in public employment do so for 
state and local governments.1
The Private Sector Transformation Argument
Thomas Kochan, Robert McKersie, and I argued that a transformation 
started in private sector labor relations in the United States in the early 
1980s (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986). We observed significant changes 
in the process and outcomes of labor relations, making use of a three-tier 
framework that distinguishes a strategic, functional, and workplace level of 
collective bargaining. The key driver of this transformation was a shift in 
bargaining power in management’s favor, induced by increased interna-
tional competition, a growing and highly competitive domestic nonunion 
sector, a severe economic recession in the early 1980s, and deregulation in a 
number of key industries. These underlying economic pressures enabled 
management to act at the strategic level to drive change by making use of 
shifts in investment (abroad or domestically to nonunion alternatives) and 
other changes in corporate strategy and structure to weaken union influ-
ence. Other changes included bargaining outcomes involving pay cuts or 
freezes and other major “concessions” at the functional (middle) tier of 
labor relations and a reorganization of work practices at the workplace level 
often involving reductions in job classifications, more contingent compen-
sation, team systems of work, and more direct communication between 
workers and managers, which often bypassed traditional channels of worker 
and union leader influence.
A key bargaining process change induced by the reduction in labor’s bar-
gaining power was more decentralized bargaining through either formal 
shifts (the abandonment or marked decline in multi-company bargaining) 
or informal shifts (the erosion of pattern bargaining or the movement of 
issues from company-level resolution to plant work group–level resolution).
When analyzing bargaining process changes and the workplace impli-
cations of the transformation underway in private sector labor relations, 
 Kochan, McKersie, and I (KKM) made use of the concept of labor relations 
“patterns” as an analytic tool (Fox 1974: 297–313; Katz, Kochan, and Colvin 
2008: 108–12). The primary claim in this concept is that work practices clus-
ter into defined patterns (or clusters) rather than being more randomly 
distributed, and that much of the tension involved in everyday labor 
1 As of November 2012, 16.3 million (76%) of the 21.4 million employees who worked in the public 
sector in the United States worked for state or local governments (http://bls.gov/web/empsit/ceseeb1a 
.htm).
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relations is associated with the difficulties of shifting related practices in a 
coherent manner that yields higher performance (Katz, Kochan, and Col-
vin 2008: Chapter 5). KKM contrasted the so-called New Deal pattern of 
work practices and procedures with a more participatory pattern. The for-
mer involved job control oriented practices such as numerous job classifica-
tions and formulaic wage determination (“wage rules”) while the latter 
made use of team systems of work organization and contingent compen-
sation (Katz 1985; Katz and Darbishire 2000). KKM also observed that a 
 sophisticated nonunion pattern had emerged as a serious challenge to tra-
ditional union work practices along with pressures that arose from a more 
traditional low wage pattern, which also operated on a nonunion basis.
Arguments that expressed the transformation debate in terms of whether 
a shift was occurring away from traditional adversarial labor relations to 
more cooperative labor relations trivialized the debate and ignored changes 
in the structure and patterns of labor relations. More serious criticisms of 
the transformation thesis are provided in Chelius and Dworkin (1990) and 
Dunlop (1988 and 1993).
The Roots of Transformation—Changes in Bargaining Power
Implicit in this transformation argument are assumptions about the sources 
of bargaining power. For the purposes of this article, it is helpful to clarify 
those sources of power as they become relevant when developments in the 
public and private sectors are compared.
Bargaining power comprises total and relative power. Total power is the 
amount of resources available to be divided between labor and manage-
ment at any point in time in a given bargaining relationship. Total power in 
the private sector equates to the level of profits, which is influenced by both 
macro- and microeconomic factors (Katz, Kochan, and Colvin 2008: 78–85). 
The strategic determinants of relative bargaining power in the private sec-
tor are strike leverage and the elasticity of demand for labor. Strike leverage 
matters because intelligent bargainers on either side would not agree to a 
negotiated settlement that differs much from the outcome that could be 
achieved with a strike (or lock-out). In effect, the expected strike outcome 
serves as the threat point in negotiations in terms of whether a strike actu-
ally occurs (Hicks 1932). Ceteris paribus, labor has more bargaining power 
in a given negotiation if it is more willing or able to stay out on strike and 
vice versa. The industrial relations literature has long recognized that work-
to-rule, mass absenteeism, sabotage, or similar in-plant strategies can also 
exert strike-like pressure, and such tactics frequently arise in everyday nego-
tiations as a source of leverage.
The competitive pressures cited above exert their influence in part by 
lowering total power or by giving management greater strike leverage; for 
example, the international operations of multinational firms can enhance 
management’s ability to continue to operate during a strike or to absorb the 
financial losses associated with a strike action. The availability of domestic 
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nonunion operations as a source of strike replacement production similarly 
can greatly enhance management’s strike leverage.
The elasticity of demand for labor matters because workers and the union 
care about the level of employment and not just about compensation (Mar-
shall 1920). Workers and the union have more bargaining power, ceterus 
paribus, when the trade-off between wages and employment is less severe 
(i.e., less elastic) because in that situation labor is more willing to make use 
of any strike leverage it has and to press for an improvement in compensa-
tion (or some other contract term). Here again one can use these concepts 
to trace the role played by various economic factors that were leading to the 
private sector transformation mentioned above. For example, international 
competition reduced total power and increased management’s relative bar-
gaining power by making product demand more elastic and by increasing 
the availability of substitute labor, thereby also making the demand for labor 
more elastic.
In the United States, political factors do not generally directly influence 
bargaining power in the private sector given the limited amount of direct 
governmental intervention in the decisions made by private sector firms. 
Government actions indirectly influence the total bargaining power of labor 
and management by affecting the degree of competition and macroeco-
nomic demand and through their influence on strike leverage or the elastic-
ity of demand for labor. For example, trade or other regulatory policies 
influence relative bargaining power by shifting the elasticity of demand for 
labor or by altering either side’s ability or willingness to strike. The influ-
ence of government will be of particular relevance as we now compare the 
origins of bargaining power in the private and public sectors given the 
prominent role that politics plays as a direct influence on employment terms 
and conditions in that sector.
Bargaining Power in the Public Sector
Total power in the public sector is determined by the revenue (i.e., tax rev-
enues, revenue sharing, and fees for services) available to be distributed 
between labor and management in a manner analogous to the role played 
by profits in a private sector negotiation. Also, as in the private sector, both 
strike leverage and the elasticity of demand for labor are critical determi-
nants of relative bargaining power in the public sector, even though the 
strength of their influence is altered by the particular circumstances com-
mon in public sector labor relations in the United States. For one thing, 
that public sector employees do not commonly have the legal right to strike 
reduces, but does not eliminate, the leverage public employees gain from a 
strike action or a strike threat. As the 2012 Chicago teachers’ strike illus-
trates, some public employees do have the legal right to strike. Even more 
important, the absence of the legal right to strike does not prevent strikes 
from occurring or strike threats from being meaningful. A telling illustra-
tion of an illegal public sector strike is when transit workers in New York City 
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went on strike in 2005, even in the face of severe penalties imposed by the 
New York State “Taylor Law” on strikers and the striking union.2 Perhaps 
even more important than strike actions or threats are the strike-like actions 
such as work slowdowns or “blue flus” that can, and do, take place in the 
public sector.
Also relevant, twenty-two state laws provide binding interest arbitration as 
an impasse resolution procedure for at least some state and/or local govern-
ment employees (Katz, Kochan, and Colvin 2008: 362). Most often these 
interest arbitration statutes cover police and firefighters but not all state or 
municipal employees in a given state. When interest arbitration is the bind-
ing impasse resolution procedure, the potential arbitration outcome serves 
as the threat point in negotiations and thereby influences negotiated out-
comes whether interest arbitration is actually called into play to settle a 
given negotiation (Farber and Katz 1979).
The elasticity of demand for labor also matters as a key determinant of 
relative bargaining power in the public sector as workers and unions in the 
public sector, just like their private sector counterparts, are likely to con-
sider the trade-off between improvements in contract terms and continued 
employment as they assess whether to make use of their ability to press for 
improvements in compensation. Here again the particulars of the labor re-
lations situation and the environment matter. Given the local and service 
nature of public sector service provision, alternative sources of production 
are typically much more limited in the public sector than they are in the 
private sector, and hence, the demand for labor tends to be more inelastic 
in the public sector than it is in the private sector. In particular, interna-
tional sources of supply are more limited for public services although the 
availability of private domestic sources via privatization can make the elastic-
ity of demand significantly more elastic and to some extent counterbalance 
the lessened role for international sourcing.
How the public sector differs most from the private sector in regard to 
the determinants of bargaining power is that politics exerts direct influences 
on the determination of employment conditions in the public sector. This 
influence occurs because expenditures, employment levels, compensation, 
and other contract terms are often decided by elected officials or by voters. 
Labor relations is said to be multi-lateral in the public sector because of the 
diffusion of managerial authority, a factor that expands the variety of politi-
cal factors and political channels that influence public sector labor relations 
(McLennan and Moskow 1968: 34–41; Kochan 1974). As a result, in the 
public sector both labor and management have a strong incentive to spend 
significant time and resources trying to influence public opinion or public 
officials either through lobbying or through electoral politics. Consequently, 
for example, public employee unions in certain situations can go around 
2 A key aspect of the Taylor Law is the law’s imposition of a two-day penalty for each day an employee 
is on strike.
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recalcitrant elected officials and appeal to other elected officials in an at-
tempt to influence public decisions.
In the debates surrounding whether public employees should be granted 
the right to form unions and whether those unions should be restricted, 
which occurred in the late 1970s, the importance of politics in public sector 
labor relations came to the fore. For example, Harry Wellington and Ralph 
Winter (1969, 1971) argued for strict limits on collective bargaining rights 
and union rights on the grounds that public employees and their unions 
exert undue political influence. Wellington and Winter also claimed that 
public employees would have complex (and in their view harmful) interests 
given their dual roles as citizens and employees when they live in the juris-
diction where they work. These public employee/citizens could influence 
public expenditure and employment terms as citizen voters and not just as 
employees or union members/activists.
At the same time, recognition of the important role played by politics in 
public sector decision making does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that collective bargaining or union rights should be significantly limited in 
the public sector. John Burton and Charles Krider (1970), for example, in a 
rebuttal of Wellington and Winter, pointed out that the bargaining power 
that labor or management actually has in a given public sector setting is an 
empirical question. In particular, management may find ways to exert sig-
nificant political power, potentially by aligning with community or business 
groups or other political actors so as to limit public employee or union 
power and gains (Katz 1979).
Keep in mind that political influence on bargaining power in the public 
sector also might operate through indirect channels; namely, by affecting ei-
ther strike leverage or the elasticity of demand for labor. What is clear is that 
to assess bargaining power in the public sector, it is essential to evaluate the 
political power of labor and management and that this political power in 
the public sector, in contrast to the private sector, in the United States oper-
ates through direct as well as indirect channels.
Recent Events—Evidence of Transformation?
As mentioned above, the core KKM transformation argument was that 
heightened international competition, growing domestic competition, de-
regulation, and the emergence of a sophisticated nonunion workplace pat-
tern pressured private sector unions into concessions and other related 
bargaining outcome and process changes.
Not yet clear is whether the basic economic competitive pressures that 
led to this transformation of labor relations in the private sector have played 
a comparable role in the public sector in recent years. The influence of 
each of these economic factors in the public sector seems much more mod-
est than what has transpired in the private sector. For example, given the 
local and service nature of public good provision, the role of international 
sourcing or the influence of multinational corporations has been limited. 
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And while privatization has made alternative providers and other alternative 
nonunion provision more feasible, privatization has expanded only gradu-
ally since the early 1990s.
Furthermore, growing empirical evidence suggests that privatization, 
when it has occurred, brings along significant, often hidden, costs and often 
has limited effectiveness (Sclar 2001; Hefetz and Warner 2011; Hefetz, War-
ner, and Vigoda-Gadot forthcoming). This evidence shows there has been 
no dramatic increase in the scale or success of privatization in recent years, 
especially not on the scale that could lead to transformative change. Nor are 
there regulatory changes operating in the public sector that compare to the 
deregulation that took place in the trucking, airlines, and telecommunica-
tions industries in the U.S. private sector.
The Absence of a Shift to More Decentralized Bargaining 
Structures in the Public Sector
Another key aspect of private sector transformation that does not appear in 
the public sector is the shift to more decentralized collective bargaining 
structures. The public sector in the United States, on the contrary, has long 
been characterized by extremely decentralized bargaining, especially that 
involving elementary and secondary education in which key allocation deci-
sions are most commonly made at the local school district level (Anderson 
1972). For other public services, in many cities and states highly fragmented 
collective bargaining occurs. New York City, for example, negotiates more 
than 100 separate collective bargaining agreements, and any form of coali-
tion bargaining among these units historically has been rare (Lewin and 
McCormick 1981). Although pattern bargaining influences contract out-
comes in New York City and some other public jurisdictions, no evidence of 
a significant shift to more decentralized bargaining in these or other public 
jurisdictions has been observed.
If anything, a drift to more centralized collective bargaining due to cen-
tralization in the control of the public financing of municipal expenditures 
has occurred. This move is particularly true in elementary and secondary 
education for which state courts have ruled that the local financing of pub-
lic schools has worked to disadvantage school children in poor communi-
ties. These court rulings have led some states to shift to greater state 
involvement and control of local school funding (Katz, Kochan, and Colvin 
2008: 357).
Another example of increased centralization in public sector collective 
bargaining is that a number of states have taken action to address health 
care costs at the state level and in doing so have either taken this issue off 
the table of local bargaining units or constrained possible options. In Mas-
sachusetts, for example, the state passed a law mandating that local commu-
nities either join the state-wide health care plan (thereby getting significant 
savings from the bargaining power the state enjoys in dealing with Blue 
Cross and other carriers) or agree to equivalent savings in their local plans.
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Private sector labor relations transformation also has involved an increase 
in the occurrence of a participatory union pattern of labor relations (Ko-
chan, Katz, and McKersie 1986; Katz and Darbishire 2000; and Katz, Ko-
chan, and Colvin 2008: 109). While the actual spread and success of this 
participatory pattern in the private sector remains in dispute, in part attrib-
utable to the absence of any sort of national survey of workplace practices, 
little evidence of a similar spread in the public sector can be found beyond 
a few showcase examples of participatory labor relations in local school dis-
tricts and some experimentation with more contingent compensation and 
team systems of work in a few municipal or state jurisdictions (U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor 1996; Lewin, Kochan, and Keefe 2012; Rubinstein and Mc-
Carthy 2012). The growth of either sophisticated nonunion or participatory 
union labor relations patterns in the public sector clearly has been modest.
Developments in the Elementary and Secondary School Sector
Elementary and secondary school teachers and expenditures represent a 
sizeable fraction of public employment and public sector budgets.3 Conse-
quently, developments in elementary and secondary education exert a criti-
cal influence on the course of public sector labor–management relations. 
Public schools are heavily unionized while the growing private school sector, 
which includes charter schools, is largely nonunion. So, the extent of fur-
ther privatization of elementary and secondary education may emerge as a 
pressure for broad change in public sector labor relations.
At the same time, several factors are likely to limit the growth of school 
privatization. For one thing, unionized teachers in a number of school dis-
tricts have exhibited a willingness to agree to significant pay and work rule 
concessions as part of negotiated changes in collective bargaining agree-
ments (Lewin, Keefe, and Kochan 2012). In addition, unionized teachers in 
many school districts have accepted teacher evaluation systems and other 
performance management changes (Rubinstein and McCarthy 2012). As a 
result, whether de-unionization or even more modest weakening of union 
influence is a necessary ingredient to progressive school reform is not clear. 
Furthermore, a growing body of research calls into question the claims that 
charter and other private schools have inherent student achievement or 
other performance advantages (Ravitch 2010; Loeb 2011).
The Political Nature of Public Sector Labor Relations
The critical drivers of developments in Wisconsin and other jurisdictions 
that call into question the future strength of public employees and their 
unions are political in nature. Public employee and public employee union 
3 As of November 2012, 7.8 million “education” workers within a total of 14.1 million local government 
workers were employed, which equals 56% of all local government employment (http://bls.gov/web 
/empsit/ceseeb1a.htm).
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rights have been challenged by the political actions of figures such as gover-
nors Chris Christie in New Jersey or Scott Walker in Wisconsin. If a funda-
mental transformation were to emerge in public sector labor relations it 
would most likely come as a result of the reduced willingness of the public 
to pay for public expenditures or public employee contract gains. Taxpayer 
actions can have the most significant effect on public sector labor relations 
through the reductions in total power that occur by means of reductions in 
available revenues. Secondary effects on the relative power of public em-
ployee unions could occur through the increased willingness of the public 
to withstand strikes or the efforts of public officials to explore alternative 
sources of supply for public services. All of these changes in bargaining 
power involve channels through which political factors influence public sec-
tor labor relations. The point is that any significant transformation of public 
sector labor relations would likely be driven by shifts in the political power 
of public employees and their unions.
Comparisons with the Mid-1970s Taxpayer Revolt
Given the critical role that politics can play in public sector labor relations, 
insights into the future of public sector labor relations can be gleaned by 
re-examining an earlier era when taxpayer attitudes seemingly turned 
against public employees and their unions. During spring 1975, a “taxpayer 
revolt” was propelled by the default crisis that emerged when New York City 
was unable to cover its operating expenses and had to rely on support from 
New York State. New York City administrators also reset compensation terms 
in a number of New York City employee labor agreements, which included 
wage freezes and pension reductions (Weitzman 1979). Concern that simi-
lar budget problems were occurring in other jurisdictions spread to other 
cities and states in the late 1970s, and this in turn contributed to legislative 
changes such as the passage of Proposition 13 in California, which sharply 
limited property tax revenues. From 1975 to 1979, eight states, in addition 
to California, passed some sort of tax or public expenditure limitation (Gov-
ernment Employee Relations Report 1979). These ballot measures exer-
cised large effects because they led to significant reductions in tax revenues 
and correspondingly, reduced the total power held by labor and manage-
ment in those jurisdictions.
In San Francisco, a traditional “labor town,” in 1975 and 1976 public em-
ployees faced an energized Board of Supervisors, including future senator 
Diane Feinstein, and an activated business community who pointed to New 
York City’s default crisis as they pressed for labor concessions from San Fran-
cisco’s employees. Steep concessions did indeed follow for a number of San 
Francisco’s employees, and changes in the city’s pension plans covering po-
lice and firefighters occurred only after voters approved ballot measures that 
specifically altered pay and pension setting procedures or levels (Katz 1979).
A number of parallels can be noted in the taxpayer concerns that sur-
faced in the mid-1970s and those that have arisen recently in various states. 
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In New York City in 1975, anger against public employee unions was fueled 
by claims that the city’s default was in large part due to the increased costs of 
pensions received by city employees. Similarly, in San Francisco in 1976, 
citizens and the business community were particularly agitated by the al-
leged large pension benefits received by city police and firefighters as well 
as questions about whether, and for how long, the city could afford its pen-
sion obligations (Katz 1979). In recent years much attention has likewise 
been focused on the long-term costs of city and state public employee pen-
sions. In addition, attention in the media has been drawn to the financial 
crises and potential bankruptcies facing the national governments of Greece 
and Spain due to alleged expensive public employee salaries and pensions.
At the same time, it is telling that in the mid-1970s while rollbacks in pub-
lic employee compensation occurred in several municipalities and future 
public sector revenue growth was constrained in some states, as in Califor-
nia, through the passage of various tax-limiting propositions and laws, this 
taxpayer revolt did not last and did not lead to transformative changes in 
public sector labor relations. Rather, by the early 1980s, concerns about U.S. 
competitiveness (with Japan and Europe) drew attention to the importance 
of education and led to calls from the Carnegie Commission and others for 
increases in public school expenditures. These concerns, in turn, led to the 
stabilization of public school labor relations in many districts throughout 
the country. This stabilization helped to produce sizeable contract gains for 
teachers. One indicator is that teacher median pay grew relative to the me-
dian pay for private sector employees in the 1980s. Katz and Kochan (2004: 
343) reported that average annual earnings of elementary and secondary 
school teachers relative to the average earnings of private sector production 
and nonsupervisory workers fell from 1.18 in 1975 to 1.09 in 1980, but this 
ratio then rose to 1.20 in 1985 and 1.44 in 1990.4 Also noteworthy is that the 
pay and benefit concessions imposed on public employees in New York City 
and San Francisco (and elsewhere) were not accompanied by legislative 
changes that limited public employee union membership or collective bar-
gaining rights.
Furthermore, the levels of union membership and coverage by collective 
bargaining did not fall after 1975. The percentage of all public sector em-
ployees who were union members in fact rose in the late 1970s: from 24.5 in 
1974 to 25.4 in 1976 and to 35.9 by 1980 (http://www.unionstats.com/). 
Thus, the mid-1970s taxpayer revolt did not lead to declines in either public 
sector union membership or union coverage.
By the early 1990s the taxpayer revolt had effectively morphed into a cam-
paign for greater privatization. This led to calls for a “reinventing of govern-
ment” by then Vice President Al Gore and others, but as noted above, this 
4 The average earnings of municipal police and firefighters relative to production workers earnings 
showed a similar pattern (Katz and Kochan 2004: 342). Statistical analysis of earnings differentials by 
Bender and Heywood (2012: 148–49 and 157–60) also showed increases in state and local government 
employee earnings relative to private sector earnings in the 1980s.
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did not lead to large increases in the share of public sector services that 
were actually provided through private sector service provision.
Recent Public Attitudes toward Public Employees and Their Unions
Evidence that public attitudes toward public employee and public sector 
union collective bargaining rights have fundamentally changed in recent 
years also is limited. A February 2011 New York Times/CBS News poll asked 
a sample of citizens the following questions. “As you may know, collective 
bargaining refers to negotiations between an employer and a labor union’s 
members to determine the conditions of employment. Some states are try-
ing to take away some of the collective bargaining rights of public employee 
unions. Do you favor or oppose taking away some of the collective bargain-
ing rights of these unions? If Favor or Oppose; Do you favor or oppose that 
strongly or somewhat?” Only 18% of those polled favored strongly and 15% 
favored somewhat while 38% opposed strongly and 22% opposed somewhat 
(New York Times and CBS News Poll 2011). Another question in the same 
poll asked, “In order to reduce state budget deficits, do you favor cutting 
the pay or benefits of public employees?” Of those polled, 17% favored this 
strongly and 20% favored this somewhat while 29% strongly opposed and 
27% somewhat opposed cutting pay or benefits of public employees to re-
duce state budget deficits.
When voters have been directly presented with laws that would explicitly 
limit collective bargaining and unionization in the public sector, they have 
not supported those measures in recent ballots. For example, in Ohio, in 
November 2011, residents (by a margin of 61.3% to 38.7%) voted to repeal 
legislation that would have limited public employee collective bargaining 
rights in the state (http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Ohio_Senate_Bill 
_5_Veto_Referendum,_Issue_2_%282011%29). More recently, in Novem-
ber 2012, voters in Idaho strongly (58% of voters) rejected a proposition 
that would have limited teachers’ rights to collectively bargain on wages and 
benefits (Linn 2012). Furthermore, while data from two Fields polls done in 
California in 2009 and 2011 revealed that the share of respondents who 
thought public employee pensions were too generous had risen, even in 
2011, “more respondents thought pensions were about right or not gener-
ous enough than thought them too generous” (Mitchell 2012: 212). Also 
possible is that any taxpayer concerns about excessive public employee or 
union rights that now do exist will be allayed by the accumulating evidence 
that on average public employees are not paid more than their private sec-
tor counterparts, even when pension costs and other fringe benefits are ac-
counted for (Lewin, Keefe, and Kochan 2012).
State or federal courts may well rule unconstitutional, or for other rea-
sons sharply limit, new laws that constrain public employee and public sec-
tor union rights. For example, a Wisconsin state court in September 2012 
voided most of that state’s new law restricting the collective bargaining 
rights of public sector employees, ruling that the law unconstitutionally 
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infringed on workers’ rights to free speech, freedom of associations, and 
equal protection (Bologna 2012).
Public Employee Union Membership Trends
Clearly, public sector union power will be heavily influenced by the size and 
resources of those unions and not just by public attitudes. Hence, examin-
ing membership trends within public sector unions is of value. In 2012, the 
percentage of local and state government employees who were members of 
unions stood at, respectively, 41.7 and 31.3. In 2008 those percentages were 
42.2 and 31.6.5 Although the size of this decline in union membership 
across the country is not large, the declines occurring in states that had 
made significant changes to legislation regulating union membership and 
union bargaining rights have been much larger. For example, the number 
of government employees in Wisconsin belonging to a union dropped by 
48,000 in 2012, to 139,000 from 187,000.6 If the pace of this decline were to 
continue in Wisconsin and to spread to other states, then the likelihood of 
significant transformation in public sector labor relations would increase 
given that large union membership declines would inevitably lead to union 
power declines through one channel or another.
Union membership losses could reduce the direct power of public em-
ployee unions by reducing the number of unionized employees who through 
their voting behavior could influence public budget measures or the elec-
toral fortunes of candidates based on those candidates’ views toward public 
employee pay or public employee union rights. Less directly, reductions in 
union membership would reduce union dues and thereby the financial re-
sources public employee unions would have access to with which to support 
political lobbying. Given the limited right to strike and the limited overall 
access to binding arbitration that exists in the public sector, it is less likely 
that future ballot measures will influence public employee union power 
through further limits on strikes or interest arbitration rights.
The Probable Future of U.S. Public Sector 
Unionism and Labor Relations?
History suggests that it is wise to be cautious when making predictions about 
union growth and the future of collective bargaining. For example, indus-
trial relations scholars in the 1920s failed to anticipate the massive increase 
in worker militancy and union growth that occurred during the 1930s and 
1940s in the United States. Another reminder of the difficulties of prediction 
5 The percentage of local and state government employees represented by unions (i.e., covered by 
collective bargaining agreements), respectively, stood at 46.1 and 35.1 in 2008 and had fallen to 45.2 and 
34.9 in 2012 (http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/all_nr.htm).
6 As Barry Hirsch kindly explained to the author, the sample sizes used to estimate the Wisconsin union 
membership figures are not large, yet Wisconsin data from other years suggest that the 2012 membership 
decline is not noise (http://Unionstats.com—Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson 2013).
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is provided by the inaccurate forecast of four of our field’s leading schol-
ars—Clark Kerr, John Dunlop, Frederick Harbison, and Charles Myers. In 
their magisterial book, Industrialism and Industrial Man, published in 1960, 
Kerr et al. wrote as if unions would become ever more prevalent and influ-
ential in the United States and around the globe. They failed to realize that 
by 1960, unions and collective bargaining (at least in the private sector) in 
the United States were already in the midst of what has turned out to be a 
prolonged and deep decline.
My review of recent developments in the public sector in the United 
States suggests that unions and collective bargaining in that sector, while 
facing severe pressures, is not yet transforming on a scale similar to what oc-
curred in the private sector in the United States. The likelihood that eco-
nomic pressures will induce fundamental change in the public sector is 
limited given that the various economic changes that propelled the trans-
formation in private sector labor relations—international competition and 
a growing, more sophisticated nonunion sector—have not yet occurred and 
may never occur in the public sector given the inherent local and service 
nature of public service provision.
Nonetheless, my analysis has identified four primary factors that have the 
potential to produce the sort of pressures that could lead to future transfor-
mations.
1. Given the importance of public attitudes to both total and relative 
power in the public sector and the potential volatility of those attitudes, 
major shifts in the public’s views regarding the legitimacy and appropriate 
role for unions and collective bargaining in the public sector could produce 
transformation. Above I reviewed the limited available evidence suggesting 
that public attitudes have not turned against public employee unions or col-
lective bargaining. Yet, if those attitudes do sour, then greater change in 
public sector labor relations would likely ensue.
If the public were to greatly reduce the revenues accruing to state and 
local governments, by reducing the total power of labor and management, 
significant cutbacks in public employee pay could result. Or, urged on by 
the conservative PACs and other entities now participating actively in policy 
debates, another possibility would be that legislation eliminating public em-
ployee union rights could lead to widespread declines in public employee 
union membership, which could then greatly reduce public employee 
union power or more directly constrain public sector collective bargaining.
2. The revenues available to governments critically influence the total 
power available to labor and management in the public sector. Hence, if 
revenues were to turn down significantly, because of citizen and voter reac-
tions against public employee unions or for other reasons, then public sec-
tor labor relations could face severe challenges.
Some analysts worry in particular that a future reduction in federal gov-
ernment revenue sharing combined with the ever-increasing amounts that 
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state governments will have to contribute to cover the cost of Medicare obli-
gations and public employee pension liabilities will create challenges that 
will extend indefinitely the revenue crisis that state and local governments 
faced after 2007. Countering this gloomy forecast is the fact that state and 
local government revenues have grown substantially, at least in nominal 
terms, over the last several years and many state and local government bud-
gets have moved back into balance (Dadayan and Boyd 2013a). Total state 
tax collections, for example, were above their previous peak levels in real 
terms in most states by June 2013 (these peak levels were achieved in most 
states in 2007 or 2008) (Dadayan and Boyd 2013b: 1). At the same time, 
employment in state and local governments remains below 2007 levels. 
From December 2007 to December 2012, state government employment 
declined by 1.3% (–67,000 jobs) and local government employment de-
clined by 2.9% (–422,000 jobs). This compares to a decline of 3.0% (–3.5 
million jobs) in private sector employment from 2007 to 2012 (Dadayan 
and Boyd 2013c). So, while the recent rebound in state and local govern-
ment revenues bodes well for future public sector labor relations, the slug-
gish recovery in public sector employment and the possibility of future 
declines in revenue should worry supporters of public employee unionism.
3. In recent years, press coverage of the large pension liabilities and the 
potential underfunding within public employee pension funds has been 
substantial. Public concern over pension liabilities seems to be influenced 
by more general worries about the size of the national debt and the bank-
ruptcies occurring in several countries (e.g., Greece) and in local U.S. gov-
ernments (e.g., Detroit, Michigan, and Stockton and San Diego, California). 
Voter and legislator concerns about public pension are revealed in facts 
such as, “in the first six months of 2011, 25 states enacted significant revi-
sions to their state retirement plans, with others still pending” (Bender and 
Heywood 2012: 140). As a result, the condition of public pensions could 
well be a key factor that influences public attitudes toward public employee 
unions and public sector collective bargaining when considering whether 
evidence links pension liabilities to public sector collective bargaining.
4. As discussed earlier in this essay, elementary and secondary education 
employment and related expenditures are a significant fraction of govern-
mental activity, and local schools, like public pensions, receive substantial 
press attention given concerns parents have about the quality of the educa-
tion received by their children. This concern shows up in the considerable 
focus on the role of teachers and the unions that often represent them in 
debates about the U.S. educational system. Correspondingly, the capability 
of unionized school districts and other unionized public sector jurisdictions 
to introduce cost savings and service quality improvements through negoti-
ated changes is likely to limit the pressure to reduce the influence of teach-
ers’ unions. And whether teachers’ unions are perceived as facilitators or 
resistors to school reform efforts is likely to extend beyond the education 
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sector and influence public attitudes toward public sector labor relations in 
general.
Given the importance that public attitudes will exert on the course of pub-
lic sector labor relations, future assessment and analysis of those attitudes is 
warranted. The public opinion polls cited earlier are helpful, but much 
more depth and breadth in the measurement of public attitudes toward 
public employee and union rights are sorely needed. On this issue, as with 
many of the issues identified in this article, little hard evidence is available 
and hence, the need is great for future research.
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